Discussion:
[conspire] Scamming SMC Alert recipients
Rick Moen
2018-12-07 19:14:17 UTC
Permalink
For four years, San Mateo County Office of Emergency Services has been
quietly building up a 'SMC Alert' system to notify county residents of
road closures, fires, major storm-caused flooding, tsunami warnings,
downed power lines, evacuation routes, locations of emergency shelters,
sightings of dangerous wildlife (mostly mountain lions), etc.
Notifications are by policy kept to the minimum, and opt-in (SMS, voice
calll, or e-mail). The need for such systems was underlined by the
2017 North Bay fires such as the one that devastated Santa Rosa, where
the death count was tragically inflated by people being unaware that a
wildfire was bearing down on them, literally dying in fires when they
could easily have evacuated if given warnings.

I signed up (www.smcalert.info) for the SMS messages about a year ago.
When I did, and noted that -- as with all SMS texts -- they don't even
try to authenticate them, I immediately saw the likelihood of pending
trouble. SMC Alert SMS posts originate from, the county says, one of
two displayed sending numbers, 89361 or 87844. Are you going to
remember that? Nope, nor anyone else.

The scammers finally spotted the opportunity a couple of days ago:

Dear Foster City Residents,

As part of our safety requirements by California Law, our officers
conduct an annual inspection of San Mateo County, including all
residential areas, the exterior of any communties and business
operations. A portion of the annnual inspection may also include a
random visit to units within the [missing text] inspection.
A member of our team will accompany the representative during the
inspection so there is a need for you to be at home. We must request
that all pets be secured and that your alarm system be deactivated.

Please be advised that you cannot refuse the inspector access to any
units within the community during this process. Any fines levied due
to an alarm system that is [rest of text omitted]

Text is said to have declared itself to be from the (non-existent)
'San Mateo County Security System'.

Reproduced (partial) text of the scam SMS is from KTVU-TV coverage,
http://www.ktvu.com/news/sheriffs-office-warns-of-scam-involving-san-mateo-co-alert-system

It's a pity KTVU-TV didn't reproduce the full text, as analysing those
is often enlightening and entertaining. A couple of comments:

1. Con artists often focus on projecting a tone of authority, but with
a story that's paper-thin and doesn't make sense if you bother to spend
even a moment thinking about it. For example: 'A member of our team
will accompany the representative during the inspection so there is a
need for you to be at home.' That doesn't actually make any sense at
all. It's basically word salad.

2. These guys are usually pretty illiterate, thus the pompous but
illiterate capitalising of 'Law'.


Even though the county is now trying to put out the word about these
criminals, probably the scam SMS did its intentioned job, which was to
soften up the target gullible residents' and business people's
suspicions when some burglar with a clipboard comes knocking and
demanding to be admitted to do a 'safety inspection'.

Police demanding entry are required to have search warrants (e.g., slide
them under the door upon request), otherwise the correct answer is 'No,
I'm not opening the door, and no, you may not enter.' Others may not
lawfully demand entry at all, and the correct action is to immediately
call the police emergency number and not let them in.

(There is an exception for police _not_ needing a warrant called
'exigent circumstances' establishing probable cause without a warrant,
e.g., where they're in hot pursuit of a felon.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exigent_circumstance
You still don't need to open the door. Just don't stand in the way,
and know that you might need to install a new doorframe if it really is
the police and they really want in.)


The authorities' message has been limited to:

1. Don't believe an emergency services SMS if it comes from a regular
telephone number instead of one of the pair of special five-digit ones.

2. If in doubt about whether to let someone in, check with 911 _first_.

Well, OK, as far as that goes -- but the problem with this approach is
that it's (as usual) chasing after the _last_ scam. It's more useful to
learn how to not fall for the next one. Con artists' entire gig
involves inventing very slightly plausible stories and rushing the
public into falling for them through haste and incaution, not bothering
to think. It's their metier.

The _broader_ protection you get is by insisting on stopping to think,
refusing to be rushed, and always having a strong default of 'no' if
anything smells funny. No, you may not come in. No, you may not search
my car. No, you may not 'ask just a few questions': Give me your card
and I'll have an attorney give you a call. No, I'm not paying that.
No, I'm not going where you told me to. No, I'm not going to take your
word for that. No, I'm not going to tell you any part of my credit card
number or access codes. No, I'm not answering questions: You called
me, so the first order of business is for you to indentify yourself and
state your business.

And remember the classics: 'Officer, am I free to go?' and 'I'll not be
answering questions.'




http://www.ktvu.com/news/sheriffs-office-warns-of-scam-involving-san-mateo-co-alert-system#/
https://www.almanacnews.com/news/2018/12/05/sheriffs-office-warns-of-scam-involving-smc-alert-system
https://www.sfgate.com/news/bayarea/article/Sheriff-s-Office-Warns-Of-Scam-Involving-Smc-13442327.php
https://brisbaneca.org/news/scam-involving-smc-alert
https://patch.com/california/millbrae/s/gkfid/scammers-targeting-residences-needing-alert-system-access
https://www.mercurynews.com/2018/12/04/san-mateo-co-sheriffs-office-warns-of-scam-involving-smc-alert-system/
Rick Moen
2018-12-08 03:15:12 UTC
Permalink
Meant to add a few more-general comments about the problematic trend of
security-sensitive Web sites sending the customer's cellular 'phone
an SMS with an authentication token, like a six-digit authentication
code. Yeah, funny thing about that. People are getting
social-engineered on this subject in ways that defeat the intent
and make that well-intentioned out-of-band mechanism an actual
factor in security breach:

[A] reader’s daughter had received a text message claiming to be from
Google, warning that her Gmail account had been locked because someone
in India had tried to access her account. The young woman was advised to
expect a 6-digit verification code to be sent to her and to reply to the
scammer’s message with that code.

https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/09/the-limits-of-sms-for-2-factor-authentication/

The daughter, as intended, didn't stop and think: I'm sorry, send the
verification code _where_ exactly? In this case, the thieves had
already stolen her GMail password, probably because she'd made the fatal
but extremely common error of also using that same password for another
purpose (in this case, LinkedIn) that had been security-compromised,
but in order to assume total control of her GMail account and lock her
out, they needed to trick her into providing _to them_ a verificaiton code
they caused her GMail login to send to her mobile 'phone (which they
then did).

Author & security pundit Brian Krebs goes on:

Okay, so the geeks-in-chief are saying it’s time to move away from
texting as a form of 2-factor authentication. And, of course, they’re
right, because text messages are a lot like email, in that it’s
difficult to tell who really sent the message, and the message itself is
sent in plain text — i.e. is readable by anyone who happens to be
lurking in the middle.

The SMC Alert scam illustrates the 'difficult to tell who really sent
the message' problem nicely.

Krebs also opines:

Personally, I favor app-based time-based one-time password (TOTP)
systems like Google Authenticator, which continuously auto-generates a
unique code via a mobile-based app.

Eh, no thanks. The day (e.g.) my bank tells me I need to run some
particular piece of proprietary, spying-on-me software just to use
services, I'll need to find a different way to use those services or
switch to a different provider.

Anyway, this whole area is problematic in that it mixes up authorisation
('prove you have a token I sent you') with authetication (prove you're
the real you), acting as if the former proves the latter, which it
doesn't at all. That's InfoSec 101.

o Or have the operators of security-sensitive Web sites never heard of
lost mobile 'phones?

o Also, never heard of needing access to a Web site from a location
where you lack cellular service?)

o Also#2, never heard of the widespread compromise by intruders of
telco equipment using the Signalling System No. 7 routing protocol?
https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2016/04/how-hackers-eavesdropped-on-a-us-congressman-using-only-his-phone-number/

(tl;dr: US Representative Ted Lieu was one of many people whose
smartphone activity was able to be finely tracked and eavesdropped by
computer criminals. The point being that SMS and voice traffic along
with anything else you do on a smartphone is insecure.)

Loading...